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Christopher C Lund'
In recent years, scholars have developed a variety of arguments as to how the
Establishment Clause might limit religious exemptions that impose costs on others.
Seeking historical footing for such claims, some have analogized the harm imposed
by religious exemptions to church taxes, a classic feature ofreiious establshments
traditionally conceived. This analogy has some appeal. Butit also runs into some real
problems, both practical and conceptual. On the practical evel, it would invalidate
relgious exemptions that almost everyone finds sensible-Bke prisons providing
Kosher meals to Jewish inmates. This practical problem can be traced back to its
mistaken conceptual root: the analogy conflates government support for reigious
liberty with government support for relbgion. This is a deep mistake, as the two are
quite different things. Government support for religion is impermissible in a system
Ake ours, but government support for religious liberty is a bedrock constitutional
principle. When the government provides Kosher meals toJewish inmates, it is not
a tax forJews, a tax forJudaism, or a tax for religion. It is, in a sense, a tax for religious
lberty and the religious lberty of ews specifcally But that is an entirely different
thing.
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Do religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause? Might a legal
exemption from a generally applicable law be considered an establishment of
religion? Early work by two of the best minds in the field, Douglas Laycock and
Michael McConnell, examined such claims from a historical perspective. They
concluded there was little evidence that the Establishment Clause, as originally
conceived, put any limits on religious exemptions.2
In recent years, scholars have advanced various arguments as to how the
Establishment Clause might limit religious accommodations that burden third
parties. But with history looming so large, they have also naturally wanted to address
the historical difficulty. Religious accommodations that put unfair burdens on third
parties are certainly a bad thing. But the Establishment Clause does not forbid bad
things; it forbids bad things that amount to an establishment of religion.3 So what is
the historical case for thinking that religious accommodations which burden third
parties amount to an establishment of religion?
Though this question has lingered for years, leading scholars have now developed
an answer. Burdens imposed on outsiders by religious accommodations, they say, are
akin to church taxes-the forced taxes for religion imposed by western European
countries and American colonies centuries ago. Take the case of Hobby Lobby and
the contraceptive mandate.4 If Hobby Lobby were given a full religious exemption
from the contraceptive mandate (as currently is the case under the Trump
Administration's new rules), then Hobby Lobby's female employees would go
without the prohibited forms of contraception. Those female employees, in other
words, would be paying the cost of Hobby Lobby's religious observance. Frederick
Gedicks lays out the argument well:
Like the prototypical established church, cost-shifting accommodations
grant a privilege to those who engage in the accommodated practice at the
2 Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding
of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1795-96 (2006) (footnote omitted)
("There is much originalist debate about whether the founding eneration understood regulatory
exemptions to be constitutionally required But there is virtually no evidence that anyone thought they
were constitutionally prohibited or that they were part of an establishment of religion."); Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins andHistorical Understanding ofFree Exercise ofRegion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1511 (1990) ("Even opponents of exemptions did not make th[e] claim [that religious exemptions
amounted to an establishment of religion].").
3 It would also presumably forbid good things that amount to an establishment of religion. To me,
the idea that an establishment of religion could be a good thing seems exceedingly unlikely given the
history of religious establishments in the West and given prevailing societal conditions in this country.
But if you want to think about how an establishment of religion might potentially be a good thing,
consider Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke's "Constitution of
Freedom, "1995 SUP. CT. REV. 393, 396 (1995) (exploring how Edmund Burke could see a "symbiosis
between establishment and toleration," one admittedly "antithetical to the disestablishmentarianism of
America").
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,835 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
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expense of unbelievers and other nonadherents who do not. Indeed,
forcing those who do not belong to a religion to bear the material costs of
practicing it is functionally equivalent to taxing nonadherents to support
the accommodated faith.'
From this starting point, Gedicks naturally conceives of particular
exemptions-like exemptions from the contraceptive mandate-in the same way:
"The HobbyLobbyexemption functions like a tax or assessment imposed on Hobby
Lobby employees to facilitate the exercise of their employer's religion."7
The analogy to church taxes has something to it. There is no doubt that religious
exemptions sometimes affect others. And it is widely agreed that church taxes were
a core part of an established church as traditionally conceived. So ifburdens imposed
by religious exemptions are tantamount to church taxes-if they are really church
taxes in disguised form-then stringent Establishment Clause limits on religious
exemptions follow as a matter of course.
But the argument does not work. The analogy to church taxes nicely captures the
way things seem to one of the two affected sides, but it does not appreciate at all how
things seem to the other. Examine the analogy carefully and it begins to fall apart.'
Start by considering that the analogy to church taxes, taken seriously, would
invalidate an astounding number of religious exemptions. It would invalidate
exemptions that everyone thinks of as both sensible and just. Take Kosher meals and
Jewish inmates. States and the federal government often provide Kosher (and Halal)
meals to Jewish (and Muslim) prisoners. But those meals, of course, cost extra, and
federal taxpayers are ultimately the ones footing the extra cost.'0
Think about this example with the analogy of church taxes in mind. If the
government taxing me for Kosher meals is really the government taxing me for
6 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Relgion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 363
(2014); see also NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 52 (2017) ("[T]he
founding generation of Americans committed themselves to the idea that the costs of accommodating the
faith of some citizens should not be imposed on citizens of other faiths or no faith.").
' Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict
Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 174 (2015).
s See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I
Establishment of Relgion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2146-52 (2003) (listing "public financial
support," including "land grants" and "religious taxes" as quintessential parts of the traditional established
church).
9For different, though similar, criticisms of the analogy, see Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions
and Third-PartyHarms, 17 FEDERALIST Soc'Y REv., Oct. 2016, at 50, 57 & nn.57-66, 58 & n.67.
0 How much is that extra cost? Those interested should take a look at United States v. Sec', Fla.
Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2016), where the United States Department of Justice
successfully sued the state of Florida for terminating its religious dietary programs under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Id. at 1344-46. There, the certified Kosher meal
cost the prison $3.55 per prisoner per day, while the mainline option cost $1.89 per prisoner per day. Id.
at 1345-46. The United States estimated a future cost of around $400,000 per year for the program
altogether, but Florida claimed the annual cost would be more than $12,000,000. Id. at 1345.
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Judaism, then the whole thing is unconstitutional, full stop. It does not matter how
much extra the government spends for the Kosher meals, and it does not matter that
the burden will be spread widely over all federal taxpayers. Church taxes are
unconstitutional, full stop. Flast v. Cohen and the line of funding cases make this
perfectly clear." Taxpayers can complain of the smallest governmental expenditure
on religion; they can complain even if their own contributions are too small to be
identifiable.2 So if the analogy to church taxes works, it will invalidate things like
Kosher meals to Jewish prisoners. But that is neither the only example nor the most
problematic.
Mary Stinemetz was a Jehovah's Witness in Kansas.3 She was on Medicaid and
needed a liver transplant. Being a Jehovah's Witness, she objected to the blood
transfusion that an ordinary liver transplant would require. Yet a newfangled medical
procedure, called a bloodless liver transplant, meant that Stinemetz could get a new
liver without a blood transfusion. But Stinemetz ran into a problem-no facility in
Kansas could do a bloodless liver transplant for her. The nearest one was in Omaha,
and Kansas's Medicaid office refused to reimburse out-of-state medical procedures.4
Now in the actual case, the bloodless liver transplant cost less than a regular liver
transplant, so Stinemetz's religious exemption would have actually saved Kansas
money." But change the facts. Say the bloodless liver transplant would have cost
Kansas an extra dollar. Now let us ask what Kansas should do. Should Kansas spend
a dollar of taxpayer money to save the life of this Jehovah's Witness?
If you accept the church-tax analogy, the answer is no. I am not a Jehovah's
Witness; I should not have to pay a tax to their church, not even if that tax is only a
dollar. Mary Stinemetz should die and the Establishment Clause requires that she
die. Take the analogy of church taxes seriously; this is where it leads.
Now folks like Fred Gedicks and Nelson Tebbe are sensitive, thoughtful,
considerate people. There is no chance in the world that they would allow any of this
" See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-87, 103-06 (1968).
12 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007) ("If... the question
is whether the challenged action can be traced to the contributions of a particular taxpayer-plaintiff, the
answer will almost always be no . . . ."). And, of course, taxpayers can complain about government
expenditures on religion without any "allegation that the contested expenditures will in any fashion affect
the amount of these taxpayers' own existing or foreseeable tax obligations." Flast, 392 U.S. at 118.
13 For the case and the facts that follow, see Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141,
143-46 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
14 Stinemetz ultimately won her legal case-the Kansas Court of Appeals gave her a religious
exemption from Kansas's reimbursement rules. Stinemetz, 252 P.3d at 155-56, 161-62. But she lost in
the larger sense-by the time the decision came down, Mary Stinemetz was no longer eligible for a
transplant and she died. For a longer discussion of Stinemetz, with relevant citations, see Christopher C.
Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 166-67 & nn.16-
20 (2016).
's See Stinemetz, 252 P.3d at 155 (noting that because "it appears that the bloodless technique for a
liver transplant is less expensive than a procedure involving blood transfusions," the government "is unable
to argue that the agency is being fiscally responsible as the steward of Kansas tax dollars by denying
Stinemetz' request").
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to happen. They would be as quick as anyone else (faster, in fact) to give Mary
Stinemetz that religious exemption. If forced to confront the real implications of
their church-tax analogy, they would abandon it.
They should abandon it. And, in a way, they already have abandoned it. Tebbe,
for example, says that "relatively light" or "comparatively light" burdens on third
parties are acceptable.'6 Gedicks says that only "material" burdens are a problem.7
But even to speak that way, of course, acknowledges the problem with the church-
tax analogy. One would never say that a church tax is constitutionally permissible if
it is "relatively light" or if it is "immaterial"; one would stand instead with Madison
and his famous remark about the three pence.'" The church-tax analogy simply does
not permit the distinction between religious exemptions that impose discrete burdens
on individuals from religious exemptions that spread their costs widely; the
church-tax analogy would invalidate them all.
So there must be a conceptual mistake then with this argument. Where is it? It
lies in the conflation of government support for religion (which is impermissible in
a secular state like ours) and government support for religious liberty (which is
permissible and in fact salutary). And this particular mistake has a long intellectual
history. A generation ago, people used to claim that religious accommodations
categorically violated the Establishment Clause because religious accommodations
were simply support for religion and nothing more. The Supreme Court never
bought this claim and eventually rejected it explicitly. Religious liberty and religion
were different; religious accommodations promoted religious liberty but did not
necessarily promote religion." This is a distinction every student of the subject knows
in their heart of hearts. Twelve years ago, the Supreme Court unanimously protected
the use of hoasca by a small Brazilian religious group.20 But probably none of the
justices use hoasca or think it efficacious in worship. A secular state like ours does
not promote religion. But it can, does, and should promote religious liberty.21
The same lesson applies here. Maybe we should think of the government
providing Jewish inmates with meals as involving a kind of tax. But it is not a tax for
16 See TEBBE, supra note 6, at 61.
17 Gedicks &Van Tassell, supra note 6, at 371.
's See 2 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1901) ("[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever[.]").
1 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of fesus Christ of-Latter-Day Saints, 483
U.S. at 334 ("There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."' (citations omitted)).
Others have elaborated on this theme in thoughtful ways. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty
as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Relgion, 67 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 39, 45 (2014).
20 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
21 Douglas Laycock captured much of this in his concept of substantive neutrality. See Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive, andDisaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993,
1001-06 (1990).
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Judaism or for Jews. It is not a tax for religion. It is a tax for religious liberty. And
that is different from a tax for religion, not just in degree but in kind.
This is not to say that the analogy to church taxes completely misses the boat.
There is an important connection between church taxes and harms imposed by
religious exemptions. From the standpoint of one of the two real parties in interest,
the two seem the same. But from the standpoint of the other, they are entirely
different. This is a deep problem with the church-tax analogy: it conceives of the
problem only as it appears to one of the two sides.
To conclude, everyone agrees that third-party harms are important. And I still
think the Establishment Clause has a role to play here. But it is a mistake to think
that third-party burdens are really disguised church taxes. Such a claim has some
appeal, but it gets as much wrong as it does right.
